The Role of Self-incorporation by Professional Athletes in Today\u27s Tax Climate - After TEFRA And TRA \u2784 by Connors, John
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review
10-1-1984
The Role of Self-incorporation by Professional
Athletes in Today's Tax Climate - After TEFRA And
TRA '84
John Connors
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
Entertainment & Sports Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Connors, The Role of Self-incorporation by Professional Athletes in Today's Tax Climate - After TEFRA And TRA '84, 2 U. Miami Ent.
& Sports L. Rev. 1 (1984)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol2/iss1/2
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS
LAW JOURNAL
THE ROLE OF SELF-INCORPORATION BY
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES IN TODAY'S
TAX CLIMATE - AFTER TEFRA AND
TRA '84
JOHN CONNORS*
After reviewing the various strategies that the Internal Reve-
nue Service employs to attack those Personal Service Corpora-
tions which it perceives as a tax subterfuge, the author details
the changes brought by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and espe-
cially the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.
Analyses cover new section 269A as well as the various provi-
sions which have generally eliminated the disparity between
corporate and non-corporate retirement plans. The article con-
cludes by exploring the continuing role of self-incorporation
primarily in the area of family planning.
INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act (TEFRA) of 19821 changed the role of the Personal Service
Corporation2 (PSC) as a planning tool. TEFRA installed section
* University of Wisconsin, Milwakee, Assistant Professor, M.S.T. Program, LaSalle
University (B.S.A., magna cam laude, 1976), University of Notre Dame (J.D., 1980), Univer-
sity of Miami (L.L.M. in Tax, 1984).
1. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,96
Stat. 324 (1982).
2. Corporations which generate income primarily by providing outsiders with the ser-
vices performed by their controlling shareholders. Typically capital is not a material in-
come-producing factor. See, e.g., Bailey, Section 482 and the Aftermath of Foglesong: The
Beginning of the End for the Personal Service Corporation, 15 IND. L. REv. 639 (1983);
Feuer, Section 482, Assignment of Income Principles and Personal Service Corporations,
59 TAXES 564 (1981): Manning, The Service Corporation: Who is Taxable on its Income:
Reconciling Assignment of Income Principles, Section 482, and Section 351, 37 U. MIAMI L
REV. 657 (1983).
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269A' as the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS's or Service's) newest
device for combatting those PSC's which the Service perceives as a
tax subterfuge. For a very limited group of PSC's, section 269A
gives the Service the power to allocate all of the income to the
employee/owner instead of to the PSC. Various pension provisions
have now generally eliminated the disparity between corporate and
non-corporate retirement plans for self-employed individuals, for-
merly the major inducement to self-incorporating.4 A variety of tax
and non-tax advantages to operating in corporate form remain, but
any tax savings is bought at the price of potential confrontation
with the IRS, and may be lost. Proper planning can head off this
confrontation as well as maximize savings.
A PSC might be defined as a corporation whose principal in-
come producing activity is the performance of services by its
founder, typically the principal shareholder.' Frequently the PSC
retains income by paying its employee/owner less than it is receiv-
ing as compensation for providing services, and little or no divi-
dends. Since by definition any income retained by the PSC is the
direct result of personal efforts of its employee/owner, the question
arises whether that income should rightfully be taxed to the em-
ployee/owner. Because corporations are taxed at lower rates than
individuals,6 the greater the leniency afforded the PSC to retain
income generated by the employee/owner, the more the IRS sees it
as undermining the graduated income tax structure - unless the
separate existence of the PSC can be explained by legitimate busi-
ness purposes.
PSC's became the vogue during the 1930's mostly at the hands
of entertainers, inventors, and other creative types7 seeking to have
3. I.R.C. § 269A (1982). See Wood, The Keller, Foglesong, and Pacella Cases: 482
Allocations, Assignment of Income, and New Section 269A. 10 J. CORP. TAX 65 (1983).
4. See Hira, Self-Employed Retirement Plans: TEFRA Brings Parity, but Disparities
Remain, 10 J. Pmis. PLAN. & Comp. 225 (1984); Weiss, Pension Changes Under TEFRA, 27
B. BAR. J. 8 (1983).
5. See supra note 2.
6. The effective tax rate on the first $100,000 of taxable income to the corporation is
25.75% for tax years beginning after 1982, as compared with an effective tax rate on the
first $100,000 of taxable income to the individual of 38% for taxable years beginning in
1984. Furthermore, this dramatically lower rate (i.e., approximately a 33% decrease) applies
after:
1). paying the shareholder/employee a salary and receiving a full corporate reduction
for it, and
2). especiahy after any additional amounts have been deferred by funding various re-
tirement plans (i.e., up to $30,000 for defined contribution plans and under defined benefit
plans, up to $90,000).
7. Their tax attorneys.
[Vol. 2:1
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their income taxed at lower corporate rates. In a sense it was noth-
ing more than an attempt to use the PSC as an incorporated pock-
etbook. As an additional attraction, the taxpayer received corpo-
rate deductions not otherwise available to a self-employed
individual.8 Gradually, the attraction of superior pension and
health plan contribution deductions predominated among motiva-
tions for self-incorporating 9 and led to the substitution of the PSC
for an individual into a partnership or other association. 0 The re-
sulting divorce of that individual from constraints upon the benefit
plans of his or her partners and/or any other fellow employees
raised the question of possible discrimination in addition to tax
avoidance.
The IRS has been unrelentingly concerned with possible tax
avoidance and discrimination achieved by abuse of the PSC form.
Tempering the IRS's justification for concern has been, at least in
the view of the courts, "the policy in favor of recognizing corpora-
tions as separate taxable entities."' This tension has surfaced in
the mixed response to the series of attempted invasions by the IRS
into the treasuries of various PSC's: some were successful; others
were rebuffed by the courts. Weapons yielded by the IRS have in-
cluded the sham theory, the assignment of income doctrine, and
section 482 of the Code. New section 269A is designed to reach
transactions where the other devices fail; its meaning becomes
clear in light of their limitations.
I. IRS ATTACKS ON THE PSC
A. The Sham Theory
Initially the IRS used to try to tax an employee/owner on the
income retained by its PSC under the sham theory. If the Com-
missioner could show that the PSC was a mere sham, then its exis-
tence could be ignored for tax purposes and all income would be
8. Prior to TEFRA, the self-employed professional .had only the H.R. 10 or Keogh
retirement plan available which was subject to greater restrictions on deductions than cor-
porate plans were. Selectively unfavorable antidiscrimination and Social Security integra-
tion rules also made corporate plans more appealing for businesses with a number of em-
ployees. See infra notes 67, 71, and accompanying text.
9. See Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corpora-
tions, 49 MINN. L. REV. 603 (1965).
10. E.g., Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014 (1981), ali'd, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir.
1983).
11. Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd, 429 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1970),
on remand, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972).
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attributable to the professional in his or her individual taxpayer
capacity. The sham theory reflects the notion that the corporation
is a creature of statute," and that recognition of corporate status
may demand concessions. The concessions demanded have been
relatively few. In 1943, the Supreme Court in Moline Properties,
Inc. v. Commissioner, enunciated a simple test for ascertaining
whether to recognize corporate status.1 3 What has emerged from
Moline is that only a minimal amount of business activity need
occur for the courts to recognize a corporation as a separate legal
entity. Consequently, the Service has been reluctant to assert the
sham doctrine in recent years, despite situations where it strongly
appeared that tax avoidance as a principle reason for self-
incorporating.
The case of Roubik v. Commissioner, made clear that the
sham theory would apply only in extreme cases where corporate
formalities have been disregarded." In Roubik, four radiologists
formed "Dr. Pfeffer & Associates, Chartered." Prior to incorpora-
tion, Dr. Pfeffer personally had contracted to employ the three
other doctors (including Roubik) as needed to meet his committ-
ment of services to two hospitals. The two hospitals paid Dr. Pfef-
fer directly; he paid the others. Before and after incorporation, all
four doctors also worked for other clinics. The PSC exercised no
control over their work assignments or conditions. The only change
in practice was that the two hospitals, and then the other clinics,
were paying the account of Dr. Pfeffer Associates, instead of the
account of Dr. Pfeffer. Stressing the lack of business activity and
labelling the PSC a "mere centralization of bookkeeping," the Tax
12. For a list of statutes enabling professional groups to practice as corporations, see
Bailey, supra note 2, at 639-40. These laws were largely intended to benefit doctors and
lawyers who previously were precluded from using the corporate form. A struggle between
the IRS and these professional corporations ensued. The IRS issued the "Kintner Regula-
tions" which simply stated that these groups, formed largely to obtain advantageous pension
benefits, would not be taxed as corporations. After losing a number of cases, e.g., O'Neil v.
United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969), Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1969), and United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), and following the issu-
ance of even amended regulations, the IRS withdrew them on August 8, 1969. For an excel-
lent discussion of the tax origins of the classification (as either partnership or corporation)
issue, and the tax status of professional corporations under the Kintner Regulations, see
Scallen, supra note 9.
13.- [W]hether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of
incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve
the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the
equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by
the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.
319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
14. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
[Vol. 2:1
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Court upheld findings of deficiencies to each doctor, but the major-
ity did not specifically apply the sham theory. Instead, it looked
through the form to the substance of the transaction for the "true
earner" of the income involved - the assignment of income
approach.' 6
B. Assignment of Income and Section 61
The assignment of income doctrine is the second major argu-
ment the IRS has often used to attribute income to the profes-
sional instead of to the PSC.'6 It evolved from the now famous case
of Lucas v. Earl, in which the Supreme Court declared that income
must be taxed to its "true earner," and that such taxation cannot
"be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however
skillfully devised.' 7 Its basic premise is that one taxpayer cannot
assign income to another person or entity in order to secure a tax
advantage, and it embraces the substance over form approach con-
sistent with section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) which
states: "gross income means all income from whatever source de-
rived."1 8 In the context of the PSC, the IRS has tailored the Lucas
argument to claim that since the employee/owner is the true earner
of any income retained by the PSC, it is the employee/owner who
should be taxed on it.
A thorough understanding of assignment of income principles
reveals that there are three distinct kinds of possible transfers. 9
Since this article concerns the shifting of income for planning pur-
poses from a principal wage earner to other lower bracket taxpay-
15. Both the court's and the concurring opinion distinguished the classification issue.
For the court, the issue was whether the corporation "earned" the income. Id. at 378-79.
The concurring opinion was also concerned with recognition of corporate status: "The pro-
fessional service corporation acts . . . did not relieve the corporation of the obligation of
performing some meaningful business function in order to gain recognition." Id. at 382.
16. See supra note 2.
17. 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
18. I.R.C. § 61 (1982).
19. (1) the gratuitous assignment of income (usually income not yet earned eco-
nomically)-principally a question of to whom income is taxed; (2) the transfer
of rights to income that has been earned economically but not yet recognized for
tax purposes- frequently a question of whether income will escape taxation be-
cause of tax accounting principles; and (3) the transfer of rights to income for
consideration in transactions that seek to convert ordinary income into capital
gain-a question of the character of income to the taxpayer at the time of
receipt.
Manning, supra note 2, at 667. The difference between the questions raised by the first two
kinds of transfers stems from the former involving a carryover basis and the latter a
stepped-up or market value at time of transfer basis. Id. at 667-76.
5
Connors: The Role of Self-incorporation by Professional Athletes in Today'
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
6 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
ers (usually family members), the only kind of transfer involved is
the "gratuitous assignment of income earned or to be earned," and
the important question is, who is to be taxed on the income? 0 Lu-
cas dealt directly with this situation of gratuitously transferring
the right to future wages.
The case of Helvering v. Horst, extended the reach of the doc-
trine to cover gratuitous assignments of property income.2  No le-
gal effect can be given to an "arrangement by which the fruits are
attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew. "22
Nevertheless, it is relatively easy to do planning when one can
physically divest himself of the underlying income-producing prop-
erty. What happens when the wage earner is the income-producing
property? It may be that in structuring transfers of income to
lower bracket taxpayers via their share ownership in a PSC, the
crux is to make sure that a legitimate portion of stock was ob-
tained initially by purchasing goodwill. The courts have yet to ex-
plore this exact question. In determining whether there has been
an improper assignment of income to the PSC, and whether the
PSC is conducting any legitimate business activity, the courts have
looked for the exercise of some control by the PSC over the per-
formance of services by its employee/owner(s).
C. Section 482
The third weapon in the arsenal of the IRS is section 482.23
20. Cf. Keller v. Commissioner, supra note 10, distinguishing between gratuitous as-
signment of income and apportionment between ordinary income and tax preferred. There,
I.R.C. provisions had created the deferrals so that no income would ultimately escape taxa-
tion. The Tax Court found no issue of gratuitous assignment of income also because the
employee/owner owned all of the stock in the PSC and substantially all, except for the
deferred portions, of the PSC income was redistributed to the employee/owner. See Man-
ning, supra note 2, at 685. TEFRA has amended the pension provisions so that no such
increased deferral is created by incorporating. Section 269A now also allows the IRS to allo-
cate income to the employee/owner where tax benefits are otherwise secured by incorporat-
ing, if the PSC is performing substantially all services for one client.
21. 311 U.S. 112 (1940). A father detached interest coupons from bonds that he con-
tinued to own and gave them to his son. The father, instead of the son, was taxed on the
interest.
22. See generally Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated
by the P.G. Lake Case, 14 MAJOR TAX PLAN. 47 (1962).
23. In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, . . . y owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, de-
ductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations . . if he
determines that such distribution. ..is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.
[Vol. 2:1
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Under cover of section 482, the Commissioner may apportion in-
come between two or more commonly controlled organizations,
trades, or businesses if necessary to prevent tax evasion or clearly
to reflect income. Allocation of income proceeds under an arm's
length transaction test. If the income, which would have resulted
to the controlled taxpayer (in our case the employee/owner) had it
dealt at arm's length, is the same as the income which did result,
then no allocation is necessary. 4 The Commissioner has broad dis-
cretion in applying section 482 and is not reversed on appeal un-
less his determinations are found to be an abuse of discretion, i.e.,
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Threshold issues in applying section 482 to the PSC are
whether an employee/owner as an employee qualifies as a separate
trade or business, and if so, whether the business is controlled by
the same interests.2 5 In applying the arm's length transaction test
to the PSC, courts have recognized that total compensation to the
employee/owner includes benefit and medical reimbursement plan
contributions and that deferrals are worth more to a high tax
bracket individual than to a low one.2
D. Interplay
The celebrated case of Foglesong v. Commissioner,2 7 illus-
trates the interplay between the sham theory, the assignment of
income doctrine, and section 482. Fred Foglesong was a sales rep-
resentative who marketed steel tubing for two separate manufac-
I.R.C. § 482 (1982).
24. The purpose underlying section 482 "is to place a controlled tax payer on a tax
parity with an uncontrolled tax payer, by determining . . . the true taxable income of a
controlled tax payer." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). See e.g., Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
604 (1982). See also supra note 2.
25. The Tax Court has generally recognized that section 482 even applies to situations
where the employee/owner wholly owns and controls the PSC. Fatland'v. Commissioner, 48
T.C.M. (CCH) 1107, 1110 n.7 (1984). But see Foglesong v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1102
(1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). The issue of whether the existence controlling
family members or other controlling shareholders may defeat the "same interests" require-
ment has been raised by commentators advocating a need for resort to the assignment of
income doctrine due to the inadequacy of section 482 in certain cases, e.g., Manning supra
note 2, at 677-79.
26. In Pacella, supra note 24, the Tax Court reasoned that although Dr. Pacella re-
ceived about $6,000 or $7,000 more per year in total compensation for treatment services
prior to incorporating, he was able to defer roughly $20,000 per year in pension plan contri-
butions after incorporating, and since the value of a $20,000 deferral to a taxpayer in Dr.
Pacella's income bracket was equivalent to about $6,000 or $7,000, his economic position
had not changed significantly. 78 T.C. at 620-21.
27. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), rev'd, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), on remand, 77
T.C. 1102 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). See also supra note 2.
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turers. He self-incorporated and issued 98% of the common stock
to himself, and 1 % each to his wife and to his accountant. He paid
for four hundred dollars worth of preferred stock to be issued to
his children. He informed the two manufacturers to mail checks
directly to the PSC. Employment contracts between himself and
the PSC, and more importantly, between the PSC and the two
manufacturers, were not executed until a few years later. The PSC
hired a secretary, paid sales expenses, carried insurance, and issued
thirty-eight thousand dollars worth of preferred dividends over a
four year span to the children on their four hundred dollars worth
of stock.
Initially the Tax Court (Foglesong I) agreed that the main rea-
son for the PSC was tax avoidance but that the PSC was not a
sham. Because the PSC had not been given enough control over
the actual earning process, the Tax Court assigned the income
back to Foglesong. The Seventh Circuit (Foglesong II) reversed
and remanded, marking the inappropriateness of using the Lucas
theory to reach the same result as would occur with a sham. On
remand, the Tax Court (Foglesong III) allocated income pursuant
to section 482, but on a second appeal a different panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit (Foglesong IV) held that section 482 could not apply
because the separate trade or business threshold test had not been
met. The court remanded for assignment of income treatment to
the dividends paid to his children and for commissions earned
before incorporating but paid to the PSC. The case was eventually
settled out of court.
The court agreed that the legislative history of section 482
clearly precluded one's employment status alone from being con-
sidered sufficient to constitute a basis for having a separate trade
or business so as to make the section operative for allocation pur-
poses. Thus all monies earned after incorporation were considered
those of the service corporation. Foglesong did agree to have pre-
incorporation monies earned by him assigned back and included in
his income. It was also agreed that the preferred stock dividends
would be treated as additional compensation paid by the service
corporation to Foglesong. After receiving a deduction for this addi-
tional compensation (something that was unavailable when these
amounts were treated as dividends), the total amount owed by the
taxpayer and his service corporation amounted to a little over
$3,500 plus interest. This compares to over $300,000 in deficiencies
outstanding when the out-of-court settlement process was initially
commenced.
[Vol. 2:1
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E. Cases
The first PSC cases were Fox v. Commissioner,28 and Laugh-
ton v. Commissioner,2 9 both of which were won by the taxpayer. In
the former, Fontaine Fox was a highly compensated cartoonist. Af-
ter forming a corporation to sell his cartoons, he executed an exclu-
sive employment contract with it and was to receive a fixed
monthly salary. Shortly afterwards, the PSC signed syndication
contracts for the cartoons and was paid much more than it was in
turn paying Fox. The Commissioner sought to attribute all of the
PSC's income to Fox. Employing the sham theory and the assign-
ment of income doctrine, the Commissioner asserted that Fox and
his PSC were inseparably intertwined. The Board of Tax Appeals
rejected the sham theory since the PSC had been validly formed
pursuant to state law and had adhered to all corporate formalities.
Regarding any assignment of income, the Board held that when
Fox transferred the cartoons, he transferred income producing
property itself, not income earned or to be earned from it."0
The IRS tasted a short-lived success utilizing the assignment
of income doctrine in Rubin v. Commissioner.3' Rubin had been an
officer of Rubin Bros. during the late 1950's. Dorman Mills, a cli-
ent, owed Rubin Bros. some $60,000 or $70,000. Rubin and his two
brothers formed a PSC which loaned money and provided Rubin's
management services to Dorman Mills until it recovered. The man-
agement services contract with Dorman Mills was executed by
Rubin in his individual capacity before the PSC had even been
formed. Dorman Mills was to compensate the PSC with a percent-
age of its profits. Rubin never entered into an employment con-
tract with the PSC, and the PSC was paid substantially more than
it was in turn paying Rubin.
The Commissioner sought to allocate all of the PSC's income
to Rubin relying on sections 61 and 482. The Tax Court concluded
that, while in form Rubin worked for the PSC, in substance he
worked directly for Dorman Mills. Alternatively, the court found
that Rubin should be taxed on the PSC's income under the assign-
ment of income doctrine since he controlled its income. Essentially
28. 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
29. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1939) (upholding the corporation which loaned out the fa-
mous English actor as not a sham but remanding on possible application of assignment of
income principles). The case was eventually settled out of court with no further resolution
on the Lucas theory.
30. 37 B.T.A. at 277-78.
31. Supra note 11.
9
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the court felt the taxpayer had failed to carry his burden of proof
(i.e., that there was substance in, or an economic purpose for, cast-
ing his transaction in the form he chose). The IRS victory was
quickly overturned, when on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded. Judge Friendly was distressed at what he perceived
as the "all or nothing approach" to the assignment of income doc-
trine, and the "broad sweep" of section 61.32 He remanded for ap-
plication of section 482 instead.
The court in Rubin mistakenly equated the assignment of in-
come doctrine with the sham theory. The Seventh Circuit in Fogle-
song concluded that since the corporation could not be disre-
garded, the assignment of income doctrine could not apply.33 The
Tax Court in Keller v. Commissioner termed the distinction be-
tween "classification as a corporation" and "determination of the
true earner" as "largely semantic rather than substantive. 3 Out
of fear of reversal or possibly out of lack of proper standards to
apply, the Tax Court in 1984 crystallized its position in favor of
throwing out the assignment of income doctrine with the
bathwater:
The effect of assigning income under section 61 is to hold that
the personal service corporation is a sham .... (T)wo circuits
have reversed this Court where we have sought to apply the
common law doctrine of assignment of income. Based on this
record, the assignment of income doctrine has no place in the
personal service context as long as even minimal respect is given
to the corporate entity.3 8
It does not follow, however, that the PSC is totally safe from the
assignment of income theory. As late as 1982, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Tax Court's application of section 61 to a professional
basketball player. 6
Charles Johnson played in the National Basketball Associa-
tion. He entered into an exclusive employment contract with an
already existing PSC for financial planning purposes. It is not clear
whether he owned any stock in the PSC. The teams he played for
insisted that he personally sign Uniform Players Contracts and re-
fused to deal with the PSC except to remit payments to it. Apply-
ing a refined control test under Lucas, the Court concluded that
32. 429 F.2d at 653.
33. Supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. 77 T.C. at 1019.
35. Fatland, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1112.
36. Johnson v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 882, afl'd, 698 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 2:1
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the lack of a contract between the PSC and the client teams was
critical. The PSC had also loaned money to the taxpayer. The Tax
Court in Johnson apparently did not believe that section 482 ap-
plied, unlike the Seventh Circuit in Foglesong and the Second Cir-
cuit in Rubin - the two courts which reversed the Tax Court and
saw section 482 as the preferred alternative.
New section 269A addresses the concern that section 482 may
not be able to cover all bases. 7 The new section will govern future
Johnson-type professional athletes who regularly work for only one
team, e.g. football, baseball, basketball, and hockey players.3 8 It
therefore behooves the tax planning advisers to individual players
such as tennis and golf professionals to remain aware of the more
traditional IRS assaults upon the PSC, like the sham theory and
the assignment of income doctrine. Moreover, a proper application
of new section 269A may entail a revisit to understanding assign-
ment of income principles. Before turning to section 269A, it is
worthwhile to peruse those decisions which have diminished the
potency of section 482 as well as of section 61.
In Keller v. Commissioner," the taxpayer was a physician
who, in partnership with ten other doctors, provided pathology ser-
vices to numerous hospitals and other physicians. Four years after
joining the partnership, Dr. Keller self-incorporated and substi-
tuted Keller, Inc. as a partner pursuant to a written agreement.
Keller, Inc. immediately adopted a medical reimbursement plan, a
wage continuation plan, and a qualified benefit plan. There was no
dispute that Keller's principle purpose in incorporating was to
plan for his family's needs. Separate books and records were main-
tained and great care was taken to observe corporate formalities.
However, the PSC owned no property, incurred no debt, and had
only Dr. Keller and his wife as employees.
The Tax Court rejected any proposition that the securing of
advantageous pension plans manifested tax avoidance under sec-
tion 482. Two crucial factors were that Dr. Keller owned all of the
PSC's stock, and that substantially all of the PSC's earned income
was distributed to him as compensation. While Dr. Keller's taxable
income had been substantially reduced due to pension plan contri-
37. "[P]lainly, we will sooner or later be confronted with arrangements between pro-
fessionals and corporations for which section 482 will be inadequate, and the decision today
to so lightly discard the assignment of income doctrine will come home to roost." Keller v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1045, aff'd, 73 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983) (dissent).
38. Because of the substantially all services be performed for one client prerequisite
to application of section 269A. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
39. Supra note 37.
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butions, the court blessed this result because specific I.R.C. provi-
sions allowed the deferral. Any change in this result would have to
await amendment of the pension provisions, which arrived with
TEFRA. There was no attempt to gratuitously assign income since
Dr.Keller owned all the stock and substantially all of the earnings
were redistributed to him. In applying the arm's length transaction
test, the court concluded that no section 482 allocation of income
was necessary since Dr. Keller's compensation approximated what
he would have received absent incorporation.'
The cases of Achiro v. Commissioner,41 Pacella v. Commis-
sioner,42 and Fatland v. Commissioner,4 3 reaffirmed the holding
that the creation of a corporation for the purpose of securing bet-
ter pension and other benefits does not amount to tax avoidance
under section 482. When such benefits are included in the em-
ployee/owner's total compensation, the thrust of section 482 in this
PSC context is lost: it becomes harder to show any reduction of
income under the arm's length transaction test. As incorporating is
otherwise made easier, the probability of discrimination increases.
In Achiro, no tax savings were ultimately accomplished because
the pension plans were discriminatory under the aggregation rules
of section 414(b).'
As discriminatory potential increases, more corporations are
formed for frivolous reasons, or reasons not in keeping with recog-
nized business purposes. The dissent in Keller distinguished be-
tween the incorporation of a professional business - "a physician
or several physicians incorporating their practice, along with its as-
sets, contracts, goodwill, books and records, accounts receivable
and payable, medical facilities, equipment and supplies, physical
facilities, and employees" - and the incorporation of only a por-
tion of one - "having none of these features and no practical con-
trol over the earning of income by the business."45 The dissent
identified the result when "each professional becomes a paper cor-
poration that in turn becomes a partner" as a "new creature", a
"paper octopus", the tax consequences of which had never squarely
been presented to the courts: "There is no reason to hold that
40. Supra note 20.
41. 77 T.C. 881 (1981).
42. Supra note 24.
43. Supra note 35.
44. Of the two original corporations, the pension plans did not cover any employees of
one, and the contributions and benefits of the other were not commensurate with those of
the PSC. 77 T.C. at 904.
45. 77 T.C. at 1041.
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these new creatures are immune from the assignment of income
doctrine."'46 While the majority felt that applying the assignment
of income doctrine would have been renewing an attack on the one
man PSC lost long ago, the dissent concluded that Dr. Keller was
the true earner who simply assigned his income to a corporate
shell he created.
F. Section 269A
The arrow most recently added to the Commissioner's quiver
is section 269A. Section 269A provides:
If (1) substantially all of the services of a personal service corpo-
ration are performed for (or on behalf of) 1 other corporation,
partnership, or other entity, and
(2) the principal purpose for forming, or availing of, such per-
sonal service corporation is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax by reducing the income of, or securing the benefit of
any expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other allowance for,
any employee-owner which would not otherwise be available,
then the Secretary may allocate all income, deductions, credits,
exclusions, and other allowances between such personal service
corporation and its employee-owners, if such allocation is neces-
sary to prevent avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax or
clearly to reflect the income of the personal service corporation
or any of its employee-owners.4
Thus the triggering of section 269A requires two prerequisites: 1)
that substantially all of the services of the PSC be performed for
one client and 2) that the principle purpose for forming the PSC
was to avoid or evade federal income taxes.
Given Committee Reports stating that the specific intent of
section 269A is to overturn results achieved in cases like Keller,"
and the prerequisite that substantially all of the services be for one
client, the alarming characterization of the new creature created
by allowing multiple paper corporations to operate together in
partnerships and other associations, the so-called paper octopus
set forth in the Keller dissent,49 must have struck home. But sec-
46. Id.
47. I.R.C. § 269A (1982). Section 269A was added by section 250 of TEFRA.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 633-34, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1405-06.
49. We would have MAL, Inc. at the center surrounded by the partnership and
11 corporate arms extending out in different directions, each a hollow prosthetic
device without offices, a laboratory, equipment, facilities ..... enabling each
13
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tion 269A is not limited to addressing discrimination. For a limited
group of corporations, it effectively gives the IRS perhaps unlim-
ited power to disregard the corporate entity if the purpose of in-
corporating does not appear satisfactory. Therefore, it is important
to define the contours of that limited group.
1. Scope
A PSC as defined by Proposed Regulation § 1.269A is "a cor-
poration the principle activity of which is the performance of per-
sonal services that are substantially performed by employee/own-
ers."' An employee/owner is defined as an owner of ten percent or
more of the outstanding stock.51 The term personal services is not
defined. Section 535(c)(2)(B)" deals with certain service corpora-
tions in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, account-
ing, actuarial science, performing arts, and consulting. By cross-
reference, these might serve as examples of personal services. That
section, however, does not cover real estate agents, professional
athletes, or sales representatives such as Fred Foglesong. Consider-
ing the regulatory purpose of section 269A, it is likely that its use
of the term personal services will be interpreted more broadly than
that contained in section 535. Logically, the nature of the personal
service is not intended to be dispositive so much as the functioning
(or non-functioning) of the PSC for valid business reasons.
2. One Client
A more pressing question concerns the meaning of substan-
tially all services of the PSC being performed for or on behalf of
one other . . . entity. The situation in Keller is clearly provided
for, (i.e., the PSC performs all services for the partnership). It is
less clear whether a PSC which services one hospital, for example,
but a variety of patients, is covered. On its face, section 269A does
not cover multiple client cases but even the partnership in Keller
serviced multiple clients so that the on behalf of language would
appear to control there. Section 269A should not apply to multiple
physician to have a pension plan and fringe benefit package tailored to his own
preferencea without regard to the quite different preferences of each of his part-
ners and whether or not the employees of the business were provided anything
at all.... If Dr.Keller can do this, so can the technicians. and virtually any
other employee.
77 T.C. at 1039.
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A(b)(1) (1983) (proposed).
51. Tress. Reg. § 1.269A(b)(2) (1983) (proposed).
52. I.R.C. § 535(c)(2)(B) (1982).
[Vol. 2:1
14
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol2/iss1/2
1984] SELF-INCORPORATION BY PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES 15
client situations which present a legitimate need for the PSC to
coordinate the provision of services and which do not present the
same inherent discriminatory potential found in Keller, where the
self-incorporator is one employee merely seeking isolation from fel-
low employees or associates. At what percentage does substantially
all draw the line? And should measurement proceed against total
time spent with each client or gross revenue or some other basis?
Nothing in the section or proposed regulation addresses these
questions. Presumably the courts will apply a substance over form
approach.
3. Principle Purpose
The principle purpose language contained in the new law is
similar to old section 269;53 thus it would appear that the same test
of principle purpose should apply. The inquiry under section 269 is
whether avoiding income tax by acquiring a corporation was the
principle purpose which exceeded all others in importance. Pro-
posed Regulation § 1.269A-1(a)(2), however, sets out objective
standards which radically alter that test, essentially by turning it
on its head. According to the regulation, so long as any tax bene-
fit(s) not otherwise available is secured by an employee/owner, or
so long as the PSC reduces the income of any employee/owner,
principle purpose has been evidenced."
The test for principle purpose is apparently tied to a compari-
son of income and tax benefits before and after incorporation.
Such comparison is similar to the object of the arm's length trans-
action test under section 482, and curiously, the language in sec-
tion 269A granting the power to allocate "all income, deductions,
credits, ... if . . .necessary to prevent (tax) avoidance ...or
clearly to reflect. . . income" closely parallels the language in sec-
tion 482. Yet in Keller, Achiro, Pacella, and Fatland, section 482
turned out to be ineffective pursuant to the arm's length transac-
tion test. Why would Congress repeat language after receiving an
adverse judicial reaction to it? What will distinguish the test for
reduction of income under section 269A from the arm's length
transaction test under section 482?55
53. I.R.C. § 269 (1982).
54. "Such purpose is evidenced when use of the corporation either reduces the income
of any employee/owner, or secures for any employee/owner one or more tax benefits which
would not otherwise be available." Tress. Reg. § 1.269A(a)(2) (1983) (proposed). Tax bene-
fits is broadly defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.269A(b)(6) (1983) (proposed).
55. "The moral of Achiro, Keller, Foglesong, and Pacella is that arm's length eco-
15
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One major difference between the respective sections will stem
from the different concerns each is intended to correct. Corporate
status is in no way threatened under section 482; only the propor-
tionate earnings of each admittedly separate trade or business is
involved. Far from recognizing the tendency of the PSC toward
abuse as a separate trade or business, the object of section 269A is
to undermine the corporate status for tax purposes. Not only are
proportionate earnings involved, but any tax consequences which
the PSC may claim by virtue of being a corporation may be lost
once section 269A is found to apply. Any tax benefits secured by
the PSC which would "not otherwise be available" had the services
been rendered by an individual are no longer seen as valid.56 Since
some disparities in tax treatment between corporate and self-em-
ployed retirement plans remain, (despite TEFRA's effort to equal-
ize tax treatment,)57 and since other differences exist, the proposed
regulation appears unduly restrictive. Moreover, the legislative his-
tory suggests a different interpretation. 8
4. Allocation
Section 269A differs from section 482 in that once the two pre-
nomic terms in service corporation arrangements will provide a defense to IRS adjustments
under §§ 482 and 61. But new § 269A. .. provides § 482-type powers to IRS to reallocate
income in Keller situations." BITTKER AND EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 1.05 (stud. ed. Supp. 1984). See generally Gombinski & Kaplan,
Demise of the Tax Motivated Personal Service Corporation, 1 J. COPYRIGHT, ENTERTAIN-
MENT & SPORTS L. 73 (1982); and Wood, supra note 3.
56. "The term 'not otherwise available' refers to any tax benefit that would not be
available to an employee/owner had such employee/owner performed the personal services
in an individual capacity." Treas. Reg. § 1.269A(b)(4) (1983) (proposed). Treas.Reg. §
1.269A(c) (1983) (proposed) provides a safe harbor to the objective standards of the princi-
pal purpose test: A PSC will not be deemed to have been formed for the principal purpose
of avoiding or evading federal income taxes if the federal income tax liability of any em-
ployee/owner is reduced in a 12 month period by no more than the lesser of (1) $2,500 or (2)
10% of the federal income tax liability that would have resulted in that 12 month period
absent incorporation.
57. Infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
58. For example, if a personal service corporation were formed or availed of for
the principal purpose of utilizing the corporate surtax exemption or a fiscal year
that would defer the payment of income tax or both, then the Secretary could
allocate income, etc., between the corporation and the employee/owners. On the
other hand, no such allocation would be made if under the facts and circum-
stances, the taxpayer can show that the principal purpose was not the avoidance
or evasion of income tax.
STAFF OF JOINT COMMrrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2d Szss. 326-27, GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIScAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT OF
1982, H.R. 4961 (Joint Comm. Print 1982), reprinted in WESTS INTERNAL REVENUE AcTS OF
1982, at 1275-76 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Joint Comm. Print).
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requisites have been met, it gives the Commissioner power to real-
locate all income, deductions, etc. The Committee Reports dispar-
aging the result in Keller and the insertion of the word all suggest
that once section 269A is found to apply, the Commissioner may
totally ignore the corporate entity. This result is unacceptable
from a policy standpoint because it overkills in situations where
limited reallocation would serve assignment of income principles
behind the statute's intent and where the corporation is not a
sham. Fortunately, the if necessary to clearly reflect income lan-
guage may be interpreted as limiting by the courts, and will sub-
ject the Commissioner's power to allocate according to the same
arbitrary and capricious standard that now governs allocations
under section 482.
G. Summary and Guidelines
In summary, so long as the PSC serves legitimate business
purposes and respects corporate formalities, the law will protect it
from the most blatant attack upon its integrity - the sham the-
ory. While the assignment of income doctrine remains a potent
weapon in the arsenal of the IRS, presently it is ineffective due to
recent confusion in its application. Section 482 gives the Service
broad power to reallocate income, but only among commonly con-
trolled organizations, trades or businesses and only following an
arm's length transaction test. Although section 269A has yet to be
applied, by its terms and history its main targets are: (1) the pro-
fessional whose PSC acts as no more than an incorporated pocket-
book servicing only one client, and (2) the partnership of such
PSC's, the so-called paper octopus. Assignment of income con-
cerns with control over the earning process will probably play a
role in the application of section 269A.
While the formation of a PSC to secure corporate retirement
benefits did not amount to tax avoidance or evasion under section
482, the same may not be said of section 269A. TEFRA has elimi-
nated much of the disparity between corporate and self-employed
individual retirement plans, but Proposed Regulation § 1.269A
suggests that the securing of any corporate tax consequence which
is in some way preferable and which is not otherwise available
may trigger application of the section. Once the threshold tests
have been met, it appears (just as under the sham theory) the
Commissioner may attribute all of the PSC's income to the indi-
vidual. The key is to prevent the threshhold test from being met.
For those who chose to go the corporate route after careful
17
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consideration of the changes in the pension rules (discussed in Part
II of this article) and the various tax and non-tax advantages left
after TEFRA (discussed in Part III), some guidelines should prove
helpful."
(1) The PSC should negotiate and contract directly with any cli-
ent(s), and should receive income directly from any client(s) for
providing the personal services of its employee/owner; any con-
tracts previously executed by the employee/owner personally
should be terminated and replaced with contracts executed by
the PSC;
(2) The employee/owner should respect the PSC's commitments
to clients and ideally should contract exclusively with the PSC
to ensure that the employee status is recognized;
(3) The PSC should maintain offices, equipment, books, records
and other incidents to carrying on a business;
(4) The PSC should maintain all of the incidents to carrying on
a business in its own name;
(5) The affairs of the PSC and the employee/owner should be
kept separate; there should be no commingling of funds or un-
reasonable loans made so that the PSC is not seen as a financing
device; and
(6) Especially if the PSC contracts with only one entity, or with
one entity which in turn services many clients, or if the PSC
serves more than one client but only one at a time for extended
periods, the books, records, billings, communications and busi-
ness activities of the PSC should clearly show that it is a prac-
ticing business with control over the earning process.
II. TOWARD PARITY IN RETIREMENT PLANS IN LIGHT OF TEFRA
AND TRA '84
Until TEFRA was passed, the vast number of self-incorpora-
tions were due mainly to the dramatic differences between corpo-
rate and non-corporate retirement plans. Tax qualified retirement
plans covering self-employed individuals, also known as Keogh or
H.R. 10 plans, were subject to many unfavorable restrictions that
did not apply to plans covering only corporate employees.e The
59. See also Dicker, Tax Oriented Options for the Professional Athlete, 8 REv. TAX.
OF IND. 195 (1984).
60. (A) pension or profit-sharing plan is not a qualified plan unless it is estab-
lished by an employer for the exclusive benefit of employees or their benefi-
ciaries. For these purposes, a sole proprietor is considered both an employee and
an employer, and a partnership is considered the employer of each partner ...
(Keogh plans) were subject to special rules which were in addition to the other
qualification requirements. . . . (which) also applied to qualified plans of sub-
[Vol. 2:1
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self-incorporated individual also gained additional tax savings
from lower rates, deferral of income through choice of year end,
and improved fringe benefit deductability. Through TEFRA, Con-
gress sought to subject both kinds of retirement plans to one set of
rules.61 As outlined below, TEFRA has succeeded in eliminating
many, but not all, of the increased benefits realized by self-
incorporation.6 2
After the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) was adopted
self-employed taxpayers covered under defined contribution 3 self-
employed taxpayers covered under defined contribution Keogh
plans were permitted to contribute and deduct the lesser of
$15,000 or 15% of their net earnings from self-employment for the
taxable year." TEFRA increased these limits to $30,000 and 25%
respectively for taxable years beginning after 1983.65 For defined
benefit66 Keogh plans, TEFRA increased the level of accruals per-
mitted annually to $90,000. TEFRA simultaneously reduced the
defined contribution limit to $30,000 and the defined benefit limit
to $90,000 for corporate plans. These contribution and benefit par-
ity rules eliminated one major reason for self-incorporating.
Many of the other restrictions repealed by TEFRA particu-
larly affect the role of the PSC because they applied only to Keogh
chapter S corporations... and to simplified employee pensions.
Joint Comm. Print, supra note 57, at 301. See I.R.C. § 401(a).
61. Congress believed that the level of tax incentives made available to en-
courage an employer to provide retirement benefits to employees should gener-
ally not depend upon whether the employer is an incorporated or unincorpo-
rated enterprise. Similarly, Congress believed that the rules needed to assure
that the tax incentives available under qualified plans are not abused should
generally apply without regard to whether the employer maintaining the plan is
incorporated or unincorporated.
Joint Comm. Print, supra note 57,. at 308.
62. Hira, supra note 4, gives a very detailed and thorough treatment of the changes
TEFRA made in retirement plans that exceed the scope of this article. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the changes wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, see Stein and Schier, How
the New Tax Law Affects Pension Plans, 10 J. PENS. PLAN. & Comp. 245 (1984).
63. "A defined contribution plan is one under which each participant's benefit is based
solely on the balance of the participant's account consisting of contributions, income, gain,
expenses, losses, and forfeitures allocated from the accounts bf other participants." Joint
Comm. Print, supra note 57, at 284. Annual contributions are based on a percentage of
salary.
64. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 312(a); I.R.C. §
404(e) (1981).
65. I.R.C. §§ 404(a), 415(b)(1), and 415(c)(1).
66. A defined benefit pension plan specifies a participant's benefit independently of an
account for contributions, etc. Annual contributions are based on the amount of funds de-
sired for retirement, determined actuarially.
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plans which covered employee/owners. 7 For the purposes of these
restrictive provisions, employee/owners were defined as individuals
who owned all of an unincorporated business, or more than 10% of
a partnership. Although employee/owners stood to gain the most
by incorporating, many of the restrictions relating to coverage and
antidiscrimination applied only where there also existed a number
of other common law employees. For example, pursuant to ERTA,
when annual compensation in excess of $100,000 was taken into
account for a defined contribution Keogh plan, the rate of em-
ployer contributions for any plan participant was not permitted to
fall below 7 /2 % of that participant's compensation." Regarding
defined benefit Keogh plans, the antidiscrimination rule mandated
that benefits for full-time employees be equated to a percentage
rate no lower than one-half of that used for the self-employed
owner.
For taxable years beginning after 1983, TEFRA has done away
with these antidiscrimination rules, as well as other restrictive
rules required by adoption of a Keogh plan, such as the coverage
requirement that where a Keogh plan covered an employee/owner,
it also had to cover all employees with at least three years of ser-
vice. TEFRA also brought about the following changes:
Repealed the 6% excise tax on excess contributions on behalf of
non-corporate owner/employee and provided the same carry-
over (to succeeding tax years) privilege for excess contributions
to Keogh plans as to corporate plans; 0
Repealed the restrictive rules on mandatory or voluntary nonde-
ductible contributions so that Keogh plan participants could
also make excess contributions which, although non-deductible,
67. [P]rior law required that if an H.R. 10 plan benefitted an owner-employee,
then the plan was also required to meet special standards providing employees
additional security. The special standards included rules relating to (1) coverage,
(2) vesting, (3) distributions, (4) integration with social security, (5) employee
contributions, (6) plan trustees, and (7) employers under common control. They
also imposed limitations with respect to an owner-employee which did not apply
to a shareholder-employee under a subchapter S plan or to partner under an
H.R. 10 plan whose partnership interest does not exceed 10%.
Joint Comm. Print, supra note 57 at 302.
68. I.R.C. §§ 408(k)(3)(C)(ii); 401(a)(17)(B).
69. E.R.T.A. § 312(b); I.R.C. § 401(a)(17)(B)(ii).
70. I.R.C. § 4972 (repealed) and § 401(a)(1)(D). For years after 1983, there are no
special limits applicable to self-employed plans as such. That is, the general limitations on
deductions under qualified employee plans apply also to self-employed plans. If the plan
covers both types of employees, the limits on contributions are applied separately to each
group.
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are allowed to accumulate tax-free until distribution;71
Subjected loans made from Keogh plans to participants to the
same rules governing loans from corporate plans;72 as not auto-
matic distributions unless by their terms they do not require re-
payment within five years, or exceed the lesser of a set
maximum;
7
"
Subjected the determination of whether a plan is "top heavy" to
the same standards determining whether a corporate plan is top
heavy;7'
Subjected Keogh plans covering owner/employee to the same
vesting schedules as corporate plans;75
71. Under prior law, an H.R. 10 plan which benefitted employee/owners could
not provide for mandatory employee contributions. ... If an H.R. 10 plan
benefitted only employee/owners, nondeductible voluntary employee contribu-
tions were also precluded (sec. 4972). If an H.R. 10 plan which benefitted em-
ployee/owners also benefitted other employees, voluntary nondeductible contri-
butions by an employee/owner were limited.
Joint Comm. Print, supra note 57, at 307.
72. See id. at 298. Notice that TEFRA did not change prior law prohibiting loans to
employee/owners and requiring fiduciary standards, i.e., a plan loan must bear a reasonable
rate of interest, be adequately secured, provide a reasonable repayment schedule, and be
made available on a basis which does not discriminate in favor of employees who are of-
ficers, shareholders, or highly compensated. Id. See I.R.C. § 4975(d).
73. A distribution results to the extent that the amount of the loan, when added
to the outstanding loan balance (principal plus interest) with respect to the em-
ployee under all plans of the employer exceeds the lesser of (1) $50,000, or (2)
one-half of the present value of the employee's non-forfeitable accrued benefit
under such plans. However, no loan is treated as a distribution under this provi-
sion to the extent that the amount of the loan, when added to the outstanding
loan balance with respect to the employee, totals $10,000 or less.
Id. at 296.
74. [A] defined benefit pension plan is a top-heavy plan for a plan year if, as of
the determination date, the present value of the cumulative accrued benefits for
participants who are key employees for the plan year exceeds 60% of the present
value of the cumulative accrued benefits for all employees under the plan. A
defined contribution plan is a top-heavy plan for a plan year if, as of the deter-
mination date, the sum of the account balances of participants who are key em-
ployees for the plan year exceeds 60% of the sum of the account balances of all
employees under the plan.
Id. at 314. I.R.C. § 416(g) (1983). Note: TRA '84 now defines a key employee as one who
earns more than 15% of the dollar limit on annual additions to defined contribution plans
under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) ($45,000 for years 1984 to 1987).
75. I.R.C. § 411. The purpose of mandatory vesting schedules is to insure that employ-
ees with substantial periodi of service with the employer do not lose plan benefits upon
separation from employment before retirement. TEFRA recognized that more rapid vesting
might be necessary to prevent discriminatory forfeitures by the rank-and-file in favor of
officers, etc. For top heavy plans, defined supra note 74, TEFRA provides two alternative
accelerated schedules. The first mimics the old Keogh rule, i.e., three-year full vesting. The
second dictates a six-year graded vesting beginning with 20% after two years, 40% after
three years, 60% after four years, etc. I.R.C. § 416(b). See also Joint Comm. Print at 1252,
1267. Notice that a corporate plan as well as a Keogh plan is subject to being top heavy. For
discussion of the newest provisions making certain plan qualification requirements even
21
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Extended the $5,000 death benefit exclusion to beneficiaries of
self-employed individuals provided distribution is in one taxable
year;76
Repealed prior law rules which restricted integration with social
security under Keogh defined contribution plans and extended
to all qualified plans the rule under which the tax rate and wage
base applicable to employers for old age, survivors, and disabil-
ity insurance (OASDI) under social security are the maximum
rate and base for employers figuring reductions for integration
contributions;"7 and
Subjected defined benefit Keogh plans to an integration rule for
social security payments so that plans can be integrated with
social security so long as no discrimination results. 7s
Many of TEFRA's changes have put Keogh plans in a more
competitive position with their corporate counterparts by repealing
certain restrictive rules. The law now also tends to equalize the two
kinds of plans by extending certain restrictions previously applica-
ble only to self-employed plans to cover corporate plans as well.
Many of the restrictions to Keogh plans which were extended
apply only to plans covering the employee/owner, or greater than
10% owners. They particularly affect the PSC, whose employee/
owner by definition under section 269A owns 10% or more of the
corporation. As a result, concerns with possible abuse and discrimi-
more stringent to protect employees, see Campbell, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984, 32
C.L.U. 40 (1985). See also Stein and Schier, supra note 62.
76. The exclusion is available to the estate or beneficiary of the deceased person who
dies after December 31, 1983, with $5,000 total allowed regardless of number of benefi-
ciaries. See Tress. Reg. § 1.101-2(a)(3) (1983).
77. I.R.C. § 401(1) (1983). "Under an integrated plan, an employee's plan benefits may
be reduced by taking into account social security benefits deemed to be provided by the
employers." Joint Comm. Print, supra note 57, at 305. Before TEFRA, defined contribution
Keogh plans which benefitted an employee/owner were not allowed any reductions unless
(1) the employee/owner took into account the self-employment taxes he paid for himself and
(2) not more than 1/3 of deductible contributions to the plan for the year were made on
behalf of employee/owners. Id. at 306.
For 1982, the employer's tax rate with respect to OASDI benefits under social
security is 5.4 %, and the taxable wage base is the first $32,400 of an employee's
pay. Thus, if the provisions were applicable for 1982, a profit-sharing plan could
provide contributions of 5.4% of 1982 pay in excess of $32,400 and no contribu-
tions for 1982 with respect to the first $32,400.
Id. at 313.
78. An individual is a key employee of an employer if the individual is (1) an
officer (in the case of a corporate employer), (2) is one of the 10 employees own-
ing the largest interests in the employer, (3) owns more than a 5% interest in
the employer, or (4) owns more than a 1% interest in the employer and has
compensation from the employer in excess of $150,000.
I.R.C. § 416(i)(1).
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nation by self-employed employee/owners are now directed toward
both corporate and non-corporate top heavy plans alike. For exam-
ple, two stringent vesting schedules are to be employed when a
plan is determined to be top heavy. Since most retirement plans
for PSC's by definition tend to be top heavy, the special rules be-
come almost always applicable to the PSC.
Similarly, the section 269A definition of employee/owner of
the PSC always qualifies as a key employee (as defined in TEFRA
'78 and TRA '84).7 The additional requirements that have been
extended to corporate top heavy plans target possible abuses or
discrimination favoring these key employees. These additional
qualification requirements: (1) limit the amount of a participant's
compensation which may be taken into account, (2) provide mini-
mum non-integrated contributions or benefits for plan participants
who are non-key employees, (3) reduce the aggregate limit on con-
tributions and benefits for certain key employees, and (4) limit dis-
tributions to key employees."s
Before TEFRA, a 10% penalty applied to employee/owners
for distributions from Keogh plans made before age 59 1/2. TEFRA
repealed this penalty but subjected distributions made to an indi-
vidual who is (or was) a key employee before age 59 1/2 to a similar
one. This new tax applies whether or not the plan is top heavy at
the time of distribution, in the amount of 10% on the distributed
portion attributable to accumulations or accruals made when the
individual was a key employee in a top heavy plan."1 TRA '84
makes the 10% tax apply to the extent the distribution was attrib-
utable to years in which the participant maintained a 5% or more
ownership. Again, the PSC would be affected every time.
Despite TEFRA's attempt to eliminate distinctions between
corporate and non-corporate retirement plans, several remain.
Though a technical corrections bill may be forthcoming which
would eliminate some of the remaining disparities, proper planning
dictates that they be kept in mind when considering self-incorpo-
ration after TEFRA. They are as follows:
-A self-employed person may not receive a qualifying lump
sum distribution prior to age 59 1/2 and thus may not roll such
79. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amends the definition to exclude officers who earn
less than 1 1/2 times the dollar limit on contributions under a defined benefit plan (or
$45,000). H. R. REP. No. 98-861, § 524 amending I.R.C. § 416(i)(1)(A).
80. A plan will not be tax-qualified under § 401 unless it includes provisions meeting
the additional requirements which will automatically become effective if the plan becomes
top heavy. I.R.C. § 401(10)(B).
81. I.R.C. §§ 72(m)(5), 402(e).
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distribution tax free into an IRA unless it was received because
of a plan termination due to disability. In contrast, a corporate
participant qualifies for a lump sum distribution merely by sep-
aration from employment. As a result, favorable tax treatment
such a ten-year averaging is unavailable to self-employed indi-
viduals.8 2 TRA '84 allows tax free rollovers to employees of, but
not directly to, self-employed owners.
-Contributions to Keogh plans are not deductible to the extent
they would be used to purchase life, accident, health, or other
insurance for the self-employed taxpayer. They are deductible
for corporate plans.ss
-Plan loans to employee/owners, although not taxable as distri-
butions if made within the limits described in § 72(P) are still
considered prohibited transactions for ERISA purposes and are
subject to a 5% excise tax and a possible 100% penalty tax."'
-A Keogh contribution may not create or enlarge net operating
loss. Corporate contributions may increase net operating loss.85
A minor area of disparity, one which is outside of Congress's
reach, is the deductibility of plan contributions under various state
income tax laws. Each state's laws would have to be examined.
Some allow deductions for contributions made to corporate plans
and those made by self-employed taxpayers for their employees,
but deny a deduction for contributions made on behalf of the self-
employed individual.
These parity have dealt a large disincentive to incorporating
today by making the unincorporated status and self-employed sta-
tus viable alternatives. The presently operating PSC should take
note of the changes subjecting corporate retirement plans to new
distribution and antidiscrimination rules for top heavy plans. In
addition, the threat to allocation of income under section 269A and
the uncertainty of being able to prove a legitimate principal pur-
pose led Congress to provide some tax relief to those who should
decide to liquidate.8 6 Before considering liquidation, it is advisable
to weigh the remaining advantages to self-incorporating apart from
82. I.R.C. § 402(e).
83. I.R.C. § 404(e).
84. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B); § 4975(e) defines "disqualified persons" as including self-
employed taxpayers while corporate employees fall under the exemption granted by §
4975(d)(1)(B).
85. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4)(D).
86. I.R.C. § 333 and TEFRA § 247; however this benefit was only available for 1983
and 1984 with regard to the special exception which stated that the corporation would not
recognize any gain or loss upon the distribution of unrealized receivables. Thus, there was
no chance E & P would be increased, with resulting increase in dividend income to the
distributee/shareholders.
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retirement plans.
III. THE CONTINUING ROLE OF THE PSC AS A PLANNING TOOL
Many tax and non-tax advantages to self-incorporating remain
after TEFRA and after TRA '84, including limited liability, medi-
cal reimbursement plans, group term life insurance, more favorable
tax rates, availability of additional entities to share the tax burden,
the dividends received deduction, capital gain treatment in certain
cases, availability of fiscal years, and ease of transferability. The
above advantages, as well as certain disadvantages, are introduced
below and then incorporated into a planning summary.
Most of the tax benefits discussed below are deductible by the
PSC and not included in the employee/owner's income, but would
not be deductible if the individual remained self-employed (or also
if the PSC elected S Corporation status). Hence, they are tax
benefits not otherwise available within the meaning of section
269A. Should section 269A apply, the effect would be to deny the
deduction to the service corporation and create additional income
for the recipient of those benefits.88 This might be especially im-
portant for the professional athlete who provides all of his services
to one team through his corporation. However, for the non-team
sports athlete who services many clients, the prospects of the IRS
successfully invoking section 269A, as presently written, appear
slim.
A. Medical Expense Reimbursement Plans
This feature alone makes incorporation most attractive and
TEFRA, inadvertently, may have made it more so. TEFRA raised
87. 26 U.S.C. § 1 subchapter S (1982).
88. The term "tax benefits" means any expense, deduction, credit, exclusion or
other allowance which would not otherwise be available. The term includes, but
is not limited to: multiple surtax exemptions being claimed by the owners of a
single integrated business operation conducted through multiple corporate enti-
ties, accumulation of income by the corporation, the corporate dividends re-
ceived deduction under § 243, deferral of income of an employee/owner through
the use of a corporation with a fiscal year or accounting method differing from
that of such employee/owner, the use of multiple classes of stock to deflect in-
come to taxpayers in lower tax brackets, group-term life insurance (Q 79), certain
accident and health plans (§§ 105 and 106), certain employee death benefits (§
101), meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer (§ 119),
and qualified transportation expenses (§ 124). Except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section, the term tax benefits does not include con-
tributions in a qualified employer plan.
Tress. Reg. § 1.269A (1982) (proposed).
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the minimum amount of deductible medical expenses to those
which exceed 5% of a self-employed individual's adjusted gross in-
come.8 9 Conversely, a corporation may adopt a medical reimburse-
ment plan to provide for all employees and their dependents. This
would be especially attractive where the corporation is closely held
and the family group constitutes the majority of shareholders, as in
Foglesong. The corporation may then deduct the reimbursed medi-
cal expenses in full and without any stipulated limitations,"0 while
employee/owners may exclude them from gross income.' Other-
wise non-deductible medical expenses of a self-employed individ-
ual, (allowable deductions only up to 5% of his adjusted gross in-
come), would be fully deductible by a corporation. More
importantly, while the self-employed individual must pay his med-
ical expenses with after-tax dollars, his corporate counterpart has
his reimbursed with tax-free dollars.
B. Other Insurance Plans
The cost of up to $50,000 of group term life insurance may be
deducted by the corporation and excluded from the income of the
corporate employee. As with most of these benefits, TEFRA will
deny the exclusion if the plan discriminates against a certain seg-
ment of employees. This should not pose an obstacle where the
service corporation is closely held. Even with a few outside-the-
family employees, the insurance rates versus the benefits provided
should not cause this to be offered on a discriminatory basis. The
costs of health and disability insurance may also be deducted by a
corporation and would be excluded from an employee's gross
income.
C. Rates
Corporate rates, especially at lower levels, are more favorable
than those accorded individuals. The total tax on the first $100,000
of corporate taxable income is $25,750 (an effective rate of less
than 26%) for taxable years beginning after 1982. The corporate
rate over this amount is a maximum of 46%, while an individual's
levels out at 50% (or approximately twice the 26% rate cited
above). After 1982, the tax on the first $25,000 of taxable income
within the PSC is only $3,750 compared to a maximum of $12,500
89. I.R.C. § 213(a).
90. I.R.C. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1985).
91. I.R.C. § 105(b).
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for a highly compensated self-employed individual who has sub-
stantial income from other sources (a marginal rate of 15% versus
50%). In effect, you are taking income off the top individual brack-
ets and placing it at the bottom of the lower corporate rates.
Subject to certain restrictions, the corporate employee who
controls his PSC may also direct his compensation level so as to
maximize his tax benefits better than his self-employed counter-
part."2 The self-employed individual is stuck with whatever his ser-
vices earn directly from clients; no accumulations of earnings
within another taxable entity, such as a corporation, can occur.
Likewise, the self-employed individual bears the full burden of his
total taxes, whereas the fellow investors (and these could well be
family members to whom the divided income tax burden is shifted)
in the PSC share the tax levy at the corporate level.
D. Penalty Taxes
A common ploy used by self-incorporated taxpayers is to draw
a small salary and leave the balance in the PSC to be taxed at
lower rates. Not only have the courts attacked this strategy in nu-
merous cases involving compensation in closely held corporations,
but there are also substantial penalty taxes for unreasonable accu-
mulations of earnings and for the use of the PSC as a mere vehicle
for investments, or as a personal holding company. Therefore it is
necessary to maintain perspective when taking advantage of the
lower rates.
If there is found to be an unreasonable accumulation of cor-
porate earnings - beyond the reasonable needs of the business, or
for forbidden purpose - the accumulated earnings tax may be ap-
plied under section 531 of the Code. Where one individual's ser-
vices provide nearly all of the earnings for the corporation, it is
especially difficult to defend a substantially lesser sum being paid
as compensation. On the other hand, the PSC may acquire other
businesses, and saving for expansion generally is an acceptable
purpose for accumulating earnings if the facts substantiate that as-
serted purpose. The rates are relatively high on such excess accu-
92. There is no universal rule as to what a reasonable level off compensation should
be. It must be decided on the facts in each particular case. One may look to the type and
extent of services rendered; the scarcity of qualified employees for the position; the prior
earning capacity of the employee; peculiar characteristics of the taxpayer's business; and the
general economic conditions of the period. E.g., Charles McCandles Tile Service v. United
States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. C1. 1970); Edwin's, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir.
1974).
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mulations, and the penalty tax is imposed in addition to any other
taxes due on the amount.9" The Code provides for a safe harbor in
the form of a credit of $150,000 for certain PSC's listed under §
535(c)(2)(B), and a credit of $250,000 for other corporations. 4
There is some question as to whether sales representatives (such as
in Foglesong) or real estate agents are limited to the lower credit
amount.
Another trap for the unwary professional is the personal hold-
ing company tax. To be labeled a personal holding company, (1)
passive receipts or personal holding company income must equal
at least 60% of a corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income and
(2) more than 50% of the value of the stock must be owned by no
more than five individuals within the last half of the taxable year.
Personal holding company income includes receipts from a variety
of sources, encompassing dividends, interest, certain rents and roy-
alties, and certain personal service contracts."5 The penalty is 50%
of the amount found to be personal holding company income and
is in addition to other taxes, except that personal holding compa-
nies are exempt from the accumulated earnings tax.
Most PSC's meet the stock ownership test for being consid-
ered a personal holding company, but it is a numerical limit easily
circumvented." The income test will have to be applied case by
case. Amounts received under personal service contracts will be ex-
cluded from personal holding company income only if the corpora-
tion furnishing the services retains the right to designate the indi-
vidual who will perform. This is true even where no doubt exists as
to who will actually perform, like in a PSC with only one primary
shareholder and employee. The mere expectation that this individ-
ual will in fact perform is not enough to transform the income into
personal holding company income. In contrast, where the perform-
ing individual is designated in the contract, by name or descrip-
tion, income generated from the contract is personal holding com-
93. I.R.C. § 531. The rates are 27.5% on the first $100,000 and 38.5% on accumula-
tions in excess of $100,000.
94. I.R.C. § 535(c); the accumulated earnings credit permits the corporation to exempt
from the penalty surtax the greater of the unused portion of a $150,000 or $250,000 exemp-
tion, or the addition that is made to the amount of the corporation's "reasonably accumu-
lated earnings."
95. See IR.C. § 543(a).
96. The easiest way to avoid the PHC provisions is to transfer existing or newly issued
shares to a sufficient number of persons so as to fail the fine or fewer individual shareholder
requirement. With a PSC these shareholders need to be unrelated so that the constructive
ownership rules in § 544(a) do not apply. Therefore, one in a PSC setting may be better
advised to fail the income test instead.
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pany income.9
E. Capital Gains Treatment
Income retained by the PSC can ultimately be converted into
capital gain which would be taxed at no more than 20% (the maxi-
mum tax on an individual of 50% applied to the 40% remaining
capital gain after the 60% deduction), should the shareholder sell
its stock, have it redeemed, or effect a corporate liquidation. Net
capital gain is also excluded from the accumulated earnings tax
due to the exemption granted under § 535(b)(6). Thus mutual
funds which provide for this type of return are an excellent invest-
ment vehicle (as long as the personal holding company income lim-
itations noted above are respected). Also, tax exempt interest from
investments in municipal bonds is also not subject to this penalty
tax and thus should be considered for accumulation purposes.
Upon death, stock bequeathed to beneficiaries receives a step-up in
basis to fair market value at death, so that many capital gains go
unrecognized.""
F. Other Tax Consequences
A corporation receives a dividends received deduction of 85%
of all domestic dividends. 9 As a result, if a taxpayer can success-
fully accumulate some funds in his corporation, the maximum cor-
porate tax exposure (not including possible personal holding com-
pany or accumulated earnings penalties) would be 6.9% on the
earnings derived from various stock investments made by the
corporation.100
A self-employed individual could defer up to one year's tax by
judiciously selecting a year-end after incorporating the business.
For instance, the taxpayer who chooses a year-end of January 31
would have the corporation pay only a small salary from February
1 to December 31 and then have a large bonus paid out during
January. The latter would not be reported until the return for the
second year was due. In essence, the taxpayer is receiving an inter-
97. Thus, failure of the income test may be easily accomplished by the PSC holding
numerous personal services contracts with outside third parties. This provides another rea-
son for making sure that the PSC signs any contracts with clients, in addition to those
discussed in light of the Charles Johnson case, supra note 36; and the assignment of income
doctrine, supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
98. I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1014, 1222(11), and 535(b)(6).
99. I.R.C. § 243.
100. 6.9% = (15%) x (46%).
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est free loan from the government.
Although liberal estate and gift tax exclusions exist, 0 1 it might
be possible to avoid any such tax imposed on large amounts trans-
ferred via stock ownership in the PSC. This conclusion depends on
the IRS and the courts neglecting to assert either an estate or gift
tax due to their preoccupation with imposing an income tax on the
right party. Although no gift tax was asserted or imposed in Fogle-
song, the case has no authority to recommend that no tax should
have been imposed. The risk of litigating the assignment of income
issue, as well as the possible estate and/or gift tax avoidance, needs
to be considered when projecting expected tax savings.
A large disadvantage of doing business in a corporate form is
the double taxation of income. Nevertheless, if most income was to
be distributed in the form of salaries and bonuses, there would be
little remaining for taxable dividend distributions. However, there
is the continuing and unresolved question of what constitutes un-
reasonable compensation."0 2 As mentioned earlier, this pitfall can
also be escaped where stock is sold or bequeathed after being held
for a period of time.
If an existing partnership incorporates, there may be an un-
wanted bunching of income if the prior entity used a fiscal year.
This would also hold true of the professional proprietor who de-
cided to incorporate using a fiscal year.
G. Non-Tax Advantages/Disadvantages
1. Transferability
A corporation offers easy transfer of ownership, thus facilitat-
ing sales or gifts of stock, unlike a proprietorship or partnership.
Also, a corporation can choose to have a perpetual life, unlike a
proprietorship which dissolves every time a partner is added or
withdraws. This might be a moot point where the corporation con-
sists of only the professional whose efforts resulted in most of its
income. However, the existence of stock, with its ease of transfera-
bility, is still the best means of carrying out various tax savings
and planning opportunities, especially in the closely-held family
corporation.
101. A taxable estate of up to $600,000 passes tax free (after 1986). I.R.C. § 2010. And
the first $10,000 gift per donee is excluded from taxable gifts each year. I.R.C. § 2503.
102. Supra note 91.
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2. Limited Liability
While all of the assets of the corporation or PSC may be sub-
ject to liability, those assets do not include the personal assets of
the shareholders and employee/owners. In certain licensed fields,
there are insurance restrictions and other capitalization require-
ments so as not to subject the public to hazardous and uninsured
services. Thus, the ability to incorporate may be somewhat re-
stricted, for instance, where it is required that all members of the
proposed corporation have the same professional background.
The largest, single disadvantage of doing business in corporate
form involves the expense of maintaining separate books, records,
facilities, and of complying with other corporate formalities like
keeping minutes, ledgers, etc. As we have seen from the case law,
courts ascribe great importance to the observance of such formali-
ties. There is also the risk of the many are filed, few are chosen
lottery, given todays attitude toward what the IRS perceives as po-
tential alusive tax shelters. Although Fred Foglesong drastically re-
duced a large deficiency in an out-of-court settlement, the legal
costs and other burdens of fighting with the IRS in court for over
ten years can not be taken lightly.
The professional might just as well feel this added cost and
complexity is not worth the enumerated advantages outlined
above. This might be especially so with the corporate retirement
parity rules passed with TEFRA. Also, TRA '84 further provided
technical corrections to eliminate discrepencies in the treatment of
the self-employed individual versus his corporate counterpart.
IV. CONCLUSION
The main concern for the professional athlete playing for one
team is to avoid being hit by new section 269A. However, for the
individual sports player, and possibly for the team athlete involved
in multiple business activities such as endorsements and outside
investments, operating in a corporate format appears a safe and
prosperous route to travel. Despite near parity in the retirement
area, and for the reasons discussed above, the Personal Service
Corporation remains an attractive planning tool still generally rec-
ommended by many tax professionals.
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